



**COUNCIL FOR  
MEDIA SERVICES**

**Results of monitoring of platform  
functionalities in relation  
to the 2024 Election  
of the President  
of the Slovak Republic**

**Council for Media Services**

**June 2024**

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## ABSTRACT

By virtue of its statutory powers and in the light of its experience with similar activities preceding the 2019 European Elections, as well as the lessons learned during the early elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2023, the Council for Media Services (“CMS”) actively monitored the functionalities of Facebook, Instagram, TikTok and YouTube digital platforms throughout the campaign period leading up to the 2024 Election of the President of the Slovak Republic. The CMS’s analysis focused on potential breaches of the Act on Media Services (“AMS”), fulfilling the commitments under the Code of Practice on Disinformation (“Code”) and compliance with obligations under the Digital Services Act (“DSA”). This report provides an overview of activities from the preparatory phase, monitoring and data collection as such, evaluation of findings and identification of potential gaps.

The monitoring of the platforms’ functionalities in relation to the Slovak presidential election was carried out in two main phases, during which the CMS carried out data collection (March to April 2024) and subsequently analysed the collected data, which were then incorporated into the final report (April to May 2024).

In frame of data collection, the CMS continuously monitored the platforms on its own initiative as well as based on notifications received from other government authorities. After the end of the monitoring period, the CMS sent out a questionnaire to the platforms containing questions concerning compliance with requirements.

The activities of the CMS outlined above led to the following findings:

- The CMS did not record any occurrences of content that would meet the criteria of illegal content as defined by the AMS.
- In relation to this election, the CMS did not receive any complaints from members of the public regarding the coverage of the election on social media either.
- All three monitored platforms largely met the requirement to promote user awareness of electoral processes through reliable information sources, with TikTok being the best-performing platform. Regarding the transparency of political advertising, Google mostly failed to meet the requirements and Meta mostly succeeded in meeting them, albeit with minor reservations. Regarding the implementation of preventive and awareness-raising activities targeting the public, Meta is lagging behind, while the activities of Google and ByteDance were assessed as rather satisfactory and satisfactory, respectively. TikTok met the requirements in this area with only minor reservations.

As a part of the monitoring of the platforms based on its own capacities and on reports from other government authorities during the election campaign, the CMS identified the following gaps:

- Meta’s ad library lacked translations into Slovak and Google’s Transparency Center lacked advertisers’ contact details.
- In case of Meta, we identified shortcomings in the identity verification process and the corresponding advertiser disclaimer, the transparency of which was evaluated as insufficient.
- In the last phase of the election campaign leading up to the second round of the presidential election, the CMS’s monitoring efforts identified some content that challenged the legitimate outcome of the first round of the presidential election. After the content had been reported by the CMS, Google and TikTok responded promptly by immediately removing this content. After reviewing it, Meta removed 8% of such posts.

The results of this monitoring exercise can serve as inspiration for EU Member States. Simultaneously, they could provide feedback to the Code and its working groups, in particular in terms of evaluating its effectiveness at national and European level. Furthermore, these results can also inform future activities of the Digital Services Coordinator (“DSC”) in Slovakia.

## 1 FOREWORD

In the context of the Election of the President of the Slovak Republic (“presidential election”), held in two rounds (23 March 2024 and 6 April 2024), the Council for Media Services (“CMS”) followed up on its past monitoring activities for the early elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic<sup>1</sup> (“parliamentary elections”) and the 2019 European elections, which were a part of the joint monitoring exercise within the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (“ERGA”), and updated the monitoring activity in respect of the revised 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation (“Code”)<sup>2</sup>.

The mission of the CMS is to promote the public interest in the exercise of the right to information, freedom of expression, and the rights of access to cultural values and education, as well as to perform state regulation in the areas of broadcasting, retransmission and the provision of on-demand audiovisual media services<sup>3</sup>.

In addition, the CMS uses its powers under the Act on Media Services (“AMS”) to cooperate with the most widely used online platforms in Slovakia. The CMS started collecting data on 18 March, one week before the first round of election – at the peak of the campaign, and continued its monitoring activity until the second round of election on 6 April. During this period, the CMS actively monitored the functionalities of the digital platforms. The CMS focused in particular on possible breaches of the AMS as well as on compliance with commitments under the Code and the obligations under the Digital Services Act (“DSA”)<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, the CMS monitored the transparency of provision of political advertisements on the platforms, information available to users in the ad libraries, and actions aimed at increasing the users’ awareness of the electoral processes. The CMS also focused on previously identified problematic aspects which were uncovered by past monitoring activities of the CMS during the campaign period leading up to the parliamentary elections in autumn 2023.

This report provides a comprehensive overview of the conducted monitoring activities and evaluates the CMS’s efforts in ensuring a transparent and fair digital media environment in the context of the 2024 Election of the President of the Slovak Republic.

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<sup>1</sup> CMS monitoring report: [Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic](#).

<sup>2</sup> [The Code of Practice on Disinformation](#) (“Code”) is the first tool of its kind used by multinational online companies since 2018 to commit to compliance with self-regulatory standards to eliminate the spread of disinformation. The original Code required a revision, coordinated by the ERGA working group lead by the former director of the Council for Broadcasting and Retransmission Ľ. Kukliš. In June 2022 a new text of the Code was presented, containing 44 commitments and 128 specific measures, including demonetization for purveyors of disinformation, transparency of political advertising, elimination of manipulative behaviour (e.g. fake accounts, use of bots and deepfake technologies), empowerment of users, researchers and the community of independent fact-checkers. Furthermore, the Code is expected to become part of a broader regulatory framework formed by the DSA and upcoming legislation governing transparency and targeting of political advertising.

<sup>3</sup> [Act No. 264/2022 Coll. on media services](#) (“AMS”).

<sup>4</sup> [Regulation 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC \(Digital Services Act\)](#).

## 2 BACKGROUND

The competences of the CMS as the Slovak national regulatory authority responsible for media oversight and enforcement of regulatory frameworks related to potentially illegal content on content-sharing platforms are governed by the AMS.

Under the AMS, the CMS is entrusted with the responsibility and legal competence to prevent the dissemination of illegal content on content-sharing platforms. In this context, Article 151(2) of the AMS defines what constitutes illegal online content (the relevant definition deriving from Act 300/2005 Coll., i.e. the Penal Code).

For the purposes of the Act on Media Services, illegal content refers to content which:

- exhibits the characteristics of child pornography or extremist material,
- incites an act exhibiting the characteristics of any of the terrorist offences,
- approves of a conduct exhibiting the characteristics of any of the terrorist offences, or
- exhibits the characteristics of the criminal offence of denial and condoning of the Holocaust, crimes of political regimes and crimes against humanity, criminal offence of insult of the State, race and belief or criminal offence of incitement to national, racial or ethnic hatred.

Furthermore, under Article 110(3)(q) of the AMS the CMS is empowered to cooperate with online content-sharing platforms (“platforms”) in the efficient, proportionate and non-discriminatory application of the rules for the provision of their services. Based on this power, the CMS has established bilateral communication channels with representatives of the individual companies operating these platforms, which are actively used to communicate cases of potentially illegal content or content potentially violating the rules for using the platforms.

Additionally, the CMS serves as a contact point for communication between the individual government authorities and operators of the most widely-used platforms in Slovakia (Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok)<sup>5</sup>. In practice, this means that government authorities and institutions, which also carry out monitoring of social network content based on their designated competences, report potentially problematic content<sup>6</sup> to the CMS, which subsequently consults this content or systemic elements with the platform in question within its remit.

The CMS actively monitored and analysed functionalities of the platforms in relation to the 2024 Slovak presidential election for several reasons. Firstly, the CMS paid special attention to possible violations of the AMS and the dissemination of potentially illegal content on content-sharing platforms. Another reason underlying the monitoring activity was to examine the implementation of the obligations imposed on platforms by the Code, as well as the new obligations imposed on very large online platforms (“VLOPs”) and very large online search engines (“VLOSEs”) by the DSA. The CMS examined whether online platforms actively updated their ad libraries to include comprehensive information about political and issue advertisements, thereby ensuring transparency and accessibility of information to the public, in line with the applicable legislation (DSA) and the commitments under the Code.

According to the DSA, very large online platforms and very large online search engines (“VLOPSEs”) shall analyse and mitigate the risks to European society posed by their design and operation. The DSA obliges VLOPSEs to take due diligence measures, which relate in particular to transparency and user empowerment vis-à-vis these platforms. In the context of online advertising, the Article 27 of the DSA requires VLOPSEs to clearly label paid advertising and to

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<sup>5</sup> The level of popularity of these platforms in Slovakia was confirmed by the transparency reports under the DSA, published at the end of October 2023.

<sup>6</sup> Potentially problematic content refers to content which is evaluated by the CMS as potentially violating terms and conditions (e.g. Community Standards, Terms of Service, etc.) of the platforms and which simultaneously does not exhibit the characteristics of illegal content as defined by the AMS. For such content, the CMS has no authority to initiate administrative proceedings or use other administrative tools to enforce its removal or restriction.

ensure that the user is able to identify who is presenting the advertisement and who is paying for it. According to Article 39 of the DSA, VLOPSEs shall compile and make publicly available an advertisement repository (ad library) containing all active advertisements and advertisements presented on the platform's online interface for the past year.

The Code has become part of a broader regulatory framework formed by the DSA and the new Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising<sup>7</sup>. The Code imposes several specific commitments on its signatories, including all the platforms mentioned in this report. In the Code, the platforms commit (Commitments 4 to 11) to increasing transparency of online political advertising by means of transparent marking of political advertising, verification of information about the sponsor of political advertising, and the availability of information about political advertising to the average user (e.g. in an ad library). Furthermore, the Code requires the platforms to implement preventive and awareness-raising activities targeting the public aimed at strengthening media literacy and the users' capacity to identify misinformation (Commitments 17 and 21).

Finally, the CMS monitored measures adopted by the platforms to raise citizens' awareness of the electoral processes. The CMS focused on initiatives that aimed to provide the public with relevant and reliable information about the conduct of the elections and to warn them against the dissemination of false or manipulative information about electoral processes.

## **3 RESULTS OF MONITORING**

### **3.1 Data collection**

The monitoring of the platforms' functionalities in relation to the Slovak presidential election was carried out in two main phases, during which the CMS carried out data collection (March to April 2024) and subsequently analysed the collected data, which were then incorporated into the final report (April to May 2024). The CMS followed up on the successful monitoring exercise carried out in autumn 2023 in the context of the parliamentary elections.

The CMS analysts began collecting data on 18 March 2024 (one week before the first round of the presidential election) and continued the monitoring exercise until the second round, which culminated on the election day on 6 April 2024. Throughout the entire period, the CMS continuously monitored the platforms on its own initiative as well as in response to notifications received from other state authorities. From 27 March to 6 April 2024, the CMS intensified its monitoring activities due to dissemination of narratives regarding the alleged manipulation of the results of the first round of the elections, and dissemination of potential disinformation about the presidential candidates, which lead to reporting the potentially problematic content to the relevant platforms.

Similar to the monitoring of the platforms in relation to the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the CMS sent a questionnaire to the providers of the three monitored platforms in order to obtain additional data for the evaluation of the platforms' functionalities. The questionnaire, the structure of which is described in the next section, was sent to platforms on 13 March 2024. All three monitored platforms responded to the questionnaire by 3 May 2024.

### **3.2 Evaluation of platform functionalities (in the context of user awareness and activities aimed at improving media literacy)**

In the light of the above-mentioned competences and CMS's experience with monitoring the functionalities of platforms prior to the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the CMS carried out monitoring of the functionalities of platforms which aimed to promote their users' awareness of the electoral processes (through official sources of information, i.e. the

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<sup>7</sup> [Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising \(March 2024\)](#).

Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic) and activities aimed at increasing media literacy. The following evaluation is based on the monitoring exercise conducted by CMS in March and April 2024, and on the responses of Meta, Google and ByteDance to the questionnaire received from the CMS in early March 2024.

The monitoring exercise as well as the topics of the questionnaire were based on the structure previously established in the monitoring exercise for the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The following section thus describes how the platforms used information panels and other features to increase users' awareness of the electoral processes; how they monitored the transparency of political advertising and compliance with the electoral silence period; which activities they carried out to prevent the dissemination of disinformation and to promote media literacy; how content moderation and cooperation with independent fact-checkers was implemented; and whether other relevant activities were carried out by the platforms during the presidential election period.

The evaluation of the functionalities and responses of content sharing platform operators to the questions in the questionnaires was carried out by four CMS analysts focusing on different areas (e.g. media literacy, problematic content, etc.). The evaluation method combined analysis of data provided by the platforms and the findings from the monitoring of the election campaign (e.g. response time the platforms needed for reporting problematic content). A four-point scale was used, complemented by verbal comments from the assessor. The output is a comprehensive scorecard including verbal commentary on each area.


<b>Platform</b>	<i>TikTok</i>	<i>Facebook/Instagram</i>	<i>YouTube/Google</i>
<i>1. Information panels and functionalities</i>	Met	Mostly met	Mostly met
<i>2. Political ads and silence period</i>	N/A	Mostly not met	Mostly not met
<i>3. Countering disinformation dissemination and supporting media literacy activities</i>	Met	Mostly not met	Mostly met
<i>5. Content moderation and cooperation with fact-checking organizations</i>	Mostly met	Mostly met	N/A
<i>6. Other activities</i>	N/A	Met	Met

### [3.2.1 Information panels and other features for increasing user awareness of electoral processes](#)

Having evaluated the functionalities of the platforms for increasing users' awareness of the electoral processes, it can be concluded that all the monitored platforms leveraged this function. The main difference lies in the effectiveness of the information and the data provided by the platforms in the questionnaire, especially when it comes to evaluating their impact.

The features of TikTok were evaluated as satisfactory. The information panels (located next to the videos with a link to the Election Hub) were available for almost a month and covered the period before and after the presidential election. Information shared in the Election Hub was clear, easily accessible to the users and complemented by educational features developed in cooperation with the Slovak non-governmental organisation DigiQ. TikTok also provided specific data on the traffic of the Election Hub for the examined period, recording more than 22 000 visitors.





### 2024 Presidential Election Days until the election: 0

6 April 2024

### 2024 Presidential Election

The second round of the presidential election will take place on 6 April 2024.

The polling stations will be open from 7.00 to 22.00.

### Click here to learn more

via minv.sk

### Who has the right to vote?

Voter - a citizen of the Slovak Republic who is 18 years of age on the day of the election at the latest.

### How to vote?

A voter can vote on the territory of the Slovak Republic

- in the electoral district in the list of voters of which they are registered

or

- in any polling station based on a voting card

or

- in any polling station upon presentation of a Slovak travel document (passport) and a declaration of permanent residence abroad.

- The applicable legislation for the Election of the President of the Slovak Republic does not allow for voting by mail.

**Click here to learn more**

### Make sure you stay safe online


Even though our team is determined to remove any misleading and potentially harmful content from TikTok, we advise you to learn more about the tools at your disposal to fight against disinformation. Do not hesitate to visit the website of our partner DigiQ dedicated to media literacy.

**DigiQ.sk**


**Educational videos**

For Facebook and Instagram, the features were evaluated as rather satisfactory. On Facebook, information panels were published on the election day (before both the first and the second round). The same notification was reportedly posted on Instagram as well, but the CMS detected these notifications only on Facebook during its monitoring exercise. The information panel on Facebook contained a link to the official information on the website of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. Meta provided details of the number of views, with the notifications receiving 2.19 million impressions in the first round and 2.16 million impressions in the second round.





Similarly, these features were evaluated as rather satisfactory for YouTube and Google Search. YouTube and Google Search provided Slovak users with information about the election with a link to the website of the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. The users of these services benefited from an easy access to this information, both before the first and second round of the presidential election. Separate information was presented after the second round (7 April) with a link to the official election results on the website of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. However, Google did not provide any information regarding interactions with this content, and we were therefore unable to assess whether or not the implementation was effective. The information panel was also allegedly displayed on Doodle.



### 3.2.2 Transparency of political advertising and compliance with the electoral silence period

During an electoral silence period (prohibition of publishing any information about the candidates during the 48 hours leading up to the opening of polling stations), the platforms that allow the placement of paid political advertising (Meta and Google) declare that the individual registered political advertisers are responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act on the application of the electoral silence period. The CMS observed several problematic advertisements during the monitoring process, described in the following chapters.

Based on the results of the monitoring exercise and the data provided by the platforms in the questionnaire, it can be concluded that the functionalities of Facebook, Instagram and Google Ads are rather unsatisfactory in this context. For TikTok, which declares that no political advertising is allowed

on its platform, the CMS's monitoring exercise did not detect any sponsored content that could be perceived as political advertising.

For Meta's platforms, transparency of political advertising and compliance with the electoral silence period was evaluated as rather unsatisfactory. Meta states that it does not have at its disposal any data on published political advertisements and potential violations of the rules for publishing political advertisements on their services that would specifically reflect the presidential election period<sup>8</sup>. Meta states that all political advertisements are marked with indications of "sponsored by" and "paid for by". The advertisement should appear in the ad library within 24 hours of its first presentation. Any changes or updates made to the advertisement should be displayed in the ad library within 24 hours.

Similarly, the transparency of Google's political advertising and its compliance with the electoral silence period were evaluated as rather unsatisfactory. In reply to questions about the restrictions applied to published political advertisements, Google cited data from the Google Ads Transparency Center. However, the regional data for Slovakia covers the period from July to December 2023 and therefore does not represent the presidential election period. Meta states that all political advertisements are marked with indication of "sponsored by" and "paid for by". It may take from 48 to 72 hours from the time the advertisement is displayed until its details can be found in the ad library

### [3.2.3 Activities aimed at preventing the dissemination of disinformation and promoting media literacy](#)

As a part of the evaluation of the platforms, the CMS also focused on media literacy, examining whether the platforms implemented media literacy campaigns and other information activities (e.g. warnings about the spread of disinformation or internet safety) targeting the Slovak public immediately before the presidential election. The CMS noted that the results varied depending on the platform. Activities of TikTok were evaluated as satisfactory, activities of Google and YouTube as rather satisfactory and activities of Meta's platforms as rather unsatisfactory.


TikTok ran a media literacy campaign in the period prior to the presidential election (15 March to 7 April 2024). The Election Hub was created for the presidential election in particular, containing information from official Slovak sources (the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic). Users were redirected to the Election Hub via an information panel on videos using keywords related to the election. TikTok also promoted educational videos on media literacy developed by the Slovak partner organisation DigiQ (available through the Election Hub). These videos were not created specifically for the presidential election (these were older videos on the DigiQ channel), but their aim was to highlight the importance of media literacy and to share valuable tips on how to navigate through the plethora of information.

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<sup>8</sup> Meta also claimed to have at its disposal only EU-wide data provided in the DSA transparency report, covering the period from 1 October 2023 to 31 March 2024. Regarding content moderation and violations of the rules for publishing political advertisements in the context of the presidential election, Meta only provided general data from a report published under the Code of Practice on Disinformation covering the period from July to December 2023.



Peter Pellegrini in reaction to his defeat in the first round of the presidential election. See more  
**Learn more about elections in Slovakia**



**Information about the elections**  
 Verify information about the election and voting instructions in reliable sources. **Learn more**

Google introduced a number of new media literacy tools in Google Search, such as “about this image”, “about this result” and “about this content”. Google has been supporting activities aimed at media education for seniors in Slovakia, implemented by the NGO Memo 98, since 2023. It also continues implementing its educational project for educators entitled Hrdinovia internetu (Heroes of the Internet). These long-term projects are very beneficial for media literacy; however, no campaign was run by Google immediately before the presidential election, and therefore it is impossible to evaluate their impact.

Meta did not run any campaigns to promote media literacy for the general population prior to the presidential election. In its questionnaire reply, Meta indicated that it organised a series of training sessions for a specific group of organisations (see below).

### 3.2.4 Content moderation and cooperation with independent fact-checkers

Regarding evaluation of the effectiveness of content moderation and platforms’ cooperation with independent fact-checkers during the presidential election, the CMS relied on the results of

the monitoring exercise and the questionnaire replies provided by the platforms. Content moderation and cooperation with independent fact-checkers on TikTok and its platforms were concluded to be rather satisfactory. In reply to questions about content moderation and cooperation with independent fact-checkers, Google did not provide any information in the questionnaire.

TikTok provided most of the data requested by the CMS in the questionnaire. Based on this data, it was concluded that TikTok removed or otherwise intervened in case of more than 30 000 posts. This information cannot be independently verified, as the CMS only escalated content of the platform in six cases over the examined period (with only one of them related to the election – see Chapter 3.2). The platform took steps against all these reported posts. It took the platform six days to react to the election-related post. TikTok further stated that it reviewed more than 60 videos in cooperation with independent fact-checkers. Prior to the presidential election, TikTok did not increase the number of independent fact-checkers; instead, according to the questionnaire replies, it introduced a specific mechanism to deal with crisis situations<sup>9</sup>.

As mentioned above, Meta did not provide any data in the questionnaire that would be relevant to the presidential election period and referred to data in other EU-wide reports<sup>10</sup>. Beyond the information provided in the questionnaire, it can be concluded that the requirements for content moderation were mostly met by Meta. In fact, the company responds to most escalations, with an average response time that is not significantly different from other platforms and can be described as satisfactory (three days on average from February to April 2024). Regarding cooperation with independent fact-checkers, it was noted that based on the information from the questionnaire, Meta officially stepped up its cooperation efforts before the presidential election by involving yet another organization – Demagóg.sk. Meta thus currently cooperates with two organisations on the Slovak market, which is considered a positive step. However, it should be noted that (including based on the cases described in Chapter 3 of this report) that in terms of the volume of content regularly outsourced by Meta for verification by independent fact-checkers (more than half of the content escalated by CMS from February to April 2024), these capacities are still relatively low and should be strengthened during elections.

### 3.2.5 Other relevant activities during the presidential election period

During the presidential election, Google and Meta also carried out other relevant activities.

As it did before the parliamentary elections, Meta conducted a meeting with the candidates to introduce them to the basics of safe conduct on their platforms. In its questionnaire reply, Meta declared that it organized a training for NGO partners and independent fact-checkers aimed at improving their capacity to support users in distinguishing disinformation and developing media literacy. In the questionnaire, Meta also specifically mentioned a workshop with Memo 98.

Google supported longitudinal research of disinformation narratives in Slovakia. A series of monthly reports (including prior to the presidential election) offered insights into the citizen's behaviour in relation to consumption of different types of media content. Google also provided support in the context of a special CEDMO report on the Slovak presidential election examining the main disinformation trends and narratives in Slovakia at the end of 2023 and the beginning of

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<sup>9</sup> TikTok has a Global Fact-checking Program in place, involving partners providing independent fact-checking services, among others, for the Slovak market. During events that pose a high risk in the context of disseminating disinformation (e.g. crisis situations and elections), TikTok applies a process involving a faster exchange of information about the content involving suspected disinformation between its internal teams and independent fact-checkers

<sup>10</sup> However, the questionnaire shows that Meta's data differs from that of the CMS – from February to April 2024, the CMS recorded 144 escalations, whereas in the period defined by Meta (23 March to 6 April) there were 93 cases. This discrepancy will be subject to further discussions between the CMS and Meta.

2024 and their impact on the election<sup>11</sup>. Google did not interact with any other non-profit organisations or researchers, and did not organise any activities for the candidates.

### 3.3 Monitoring of ad libraries of Meta, Google and ByteDance

In December 2023, the CMS published the results of the monitoring of the ad libraries of selected platforms (Meta Ads Library and Google Ads Transparency Center) in the monitoring report Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. This monitoring report also contains a detailed description of the environment and functionalities of the monitored ad libraries in Annex 1: Results of monitoring of ad libraries of Meta, Google and ByteDance. It also identifies and describes potentially problematic aspects of the libraries in the context of the DSA and the Code in its section entitled Problematic aspects of political advertising on platforms and inauthentic videos created using artificial intelligence tools.

Based on the results of the monitoring of the functionalities of the ad libraries of the selected platforms during the election campaign prior to the 2024 presidential election, it can be concluded that the **environment and functionalities of the monitored ad libraries are identical to the situation observed during the monitoring of the 2023 parliamentary elections, including all the problematic aspects identified at that time.**

Identified problematic aspects of ad libraries:

- Meta's ad library lacked translations into Slovak,
- Google's Transparency Center lacked advertisers' contact details.

### 3.4 Description of political advertisements displayed on platforms and user interfaces

The CMS's monitoring of presentation of political advertisement on the platforms focused on covering as wide a range of user interfaces as possible; however, we were not able to capture political advertisement on all platforms, user interfaces and media. The individual descriptions represent the presented political advertisement from the point of view of the average user, i.e. how the user sees the message indicating that an advertisement is a political advertisement.

**Simultaneously, no potential shortcomings were identified in the monitoring of individual advertisements displayed in the user environment, which was perceived as an improvement in comparison to the situation identified in the monitoring of the 2023 parliamentary elections.**

The latter had revealed absence of political advertising disclaimer for Meta and absence of labelling of political advertising for Google in the user interface<sup>12</sup>.

#### 3.4.1 Meta

##### Facebook smartphone interface – Feed

Under the name of a page/profile, there is an indication such as: "Sponsored – paid for by Ivan Korčok". In the upper right corner of the advertisement, there is an "i" icon or "Learn more about this Ad". Clicking on this icon opens a message explaining "Who pays for this advertisement" (contact details of the advertiser) and a link to learn more about the advertisement in Meta Ad Library (comprehensive information about the advertisement, date of activity, amount spent, targeting, number of impressions, i.e. the number of views and interactions with the content).

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<sup>11</sup> [CEDMO Special Brief – Slovak presidential election](#) (published on 20 March 2024).

<sup>12</sup> [Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic](#), Chapter 3.1 Ad libraries, p. 20.



**Ivan Korčok**  Sponzorované · Platí to Ivan Korčok · 

Každý deň vláda pod vedením Roberta Fica ukazuje, že sa bude správať, ako by im tu patrilo úplne všetko. Ani sa nesnažia predstierať nejakú snahu o celospoločen... Viac



ZAJTRA O 17:00  
**Nedovoľme im ovládnuť všetko:**  
**Spojme sa za Slovensko** 🇸🇰 v Ban...

 Mám Záujem

**Ivan Korčok**

**Sponsored \* Paid for by Ivan Korčok**

Robert Fico's government shows us every day they will keep on acting like they own everything. They're not even trying to pretend to make an effort...

**Let's not allow them to take absolute control:**

**Let's unite for Slovakia**

**Ivan Korčok**  Sponzorované · Platí to Ivan Korčok · 

Každý deň vláda pod vedením Roberta Fica ukazuje, že sa bude správať, ako by im tu patrilo úplne všetko. Ani sa nesnažia predstierať nejakú snahu o celospoločen... Viac



**Ivan Korčok**  Verejne známa osoba

Táto reklama je o spoločenských záležitostiach, voľbách alebo politike. [Zistite, čo to znamená.](#)

 Kto platí túto reklamu? >

 Prečo sa mi toto zobrazuje? >

 Ovládať témy reklám >

**Ivan Korčok**

Public figure

This ad is about social issues, elections or politics.

**Learn what it means.**

Who is paying for this ad?

Why am I seeing this add?

Manage ad topics

### Facebook smartphone interface – Platform user interface

No political advertising was detected.

### Facebook smartphone interface – Reels

Under the name of the page/profile, there is an “i” icon with an indication such as: “Paid for by Ivan Korčok”. At the bottom of the page, there is an indication “Sponsored”. Clicking on the “i” icon displays details about “Who pays for this advertisement” (contact details of the sponsor of the advertisement) and a link to find out more about the advertisement in Meta Ad Library.



**Ivan Korčok**  
Paid for by Ivan Korčok

#### Facebook PC interface – Feed

Under the name of a page/profile, there is an indication such as: “Sponsored – paid for by narodnapeticia.sk”. In the upper right corner of the advertisement, there is an “i” icon or “Learn more about this Ad”. Clicking on this icon displays details about “Who pays for this advertisement” (contact details of the sponsor of the advertisement) and a link to find out more about the advertisement in Meta Ad Library.




**Národná petícia**  
 Sponzorované · Platí to narodnapeticia.sk ·

Viete, čo spája Pellegriniho a Korčoka? 😬 Obaja sú ako siamské dvojčatá 🧬, podporujú vojnu 🇺🇦 a priame dodávky zbraní Ukrajině 🇺🇦, LGBTI 🏳️🌈 a sú proti neutralite Slovenska 🇸🇰. Na neprávne nesmie byť založené právo ⚖️. Prvé kolo prezidentských volieb sa podľa názoru JUDr. Štefana Harabina konalo v rozpore s ústavou 📜. Občania, do kedy budeme tolerovať nezákonnosti na najvyšších poschodiach moci? 🗳️ Pridajte sa k petícii 📝 za vyhlásenie nulitnosti kandidatúry a teda za nové voľby 🗳️.



**PODPORTE NÁZOR  
JUDR. ŠTEFANA HARABINA  
O NEÚSTAVNOSTI PELLEGRINIHO  
KANDIDATÚRY.**

NARODNAPETICIA.SK  
 Podpíšte národnú petíciu!

Viac informácií

#### Národná petícia

**Sponsored \* Paid for by narodnapeticia.sk**

Do you know what Pellegrini and Korčok have in common? They are like Siamese twins, they support war and direct supply of arms to Ukraine, LGBTI and are against the neutrality of Slovakia. The rule of law cannot be based on injustice. In the opinion of JUDr. Štefan Harabin, the first round of the presidential election violated the Constitution. Fellow citizens, how much longer will we tolerate illegality at the highest levels of power? Join the petition to invalidate their candidacy and for a new election!

SUPPORT THE OPINION OF JUDR. ŠTEFAN HARABIN ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF PELLEGRINI'S CANDIDACY.

NARODNAPETICIA.SK

**Sign the national petition!**

[Learn more](#)

[Facebook PC interface – Platform user interface](#)

No political advertising was detected.

[Facebook PC interface – Reels](#)

No political advertising was detected.

[Instagram smartphone interface – Feed](#)

No political advertising was detected.

[Instagram smartphone interface – Stories](#)

No political advertising was detected.

[Instagram smartphone interface – Reels](#)

Under the name of the page/profile, there is an “i” icon with a statement, such as: “paid for by Ivan Korčok” and the bottom of the page indicates “Sponsored”. Clicking on the “i” icon displays the information “Who pays for this advertisement” (contact details of the sponsor of the advertisement) and a link to find out more about the advertisement in Meta Ad Library.



**Ivan Korčok**  
Paid for by Ivan Korčok  
**Sponsored**



**Ivan Korčok**  
Public figure  
Paid for by **Ivan Korčok**  
Information about this advertisement was provided by Meta advertiser. When an advertiser categorises their ad as being about social issues, elections or politics, they are required to disclose who paid for the ad.

### [Instagram PC interface – Feed](#)

No political advertising was detected.

### [Instagram PC interface – Stories](#)

No political advertising was detected.

### [Instagram PC interface – Reels](#)

No political advertising was detected.

## 3.4.2 Google

### [Google Search PC interface](#)



No political advertising was detected.

### [Google Search smartphone interface](#)

No political advertising was detected.

### [YouTube smartphone interface – Video](#)

There is a message in the bottom left corner of the video advertisement, e.g.: “Ad 2 of 2 · 3:27 (i)”. Under the video advertisement, there is the name of the page/profile that ordered the video advertisement, as well as an indication, such as “Sponsored by harabin2024.sk”, and an icon consisting of three vertical dots. Clicking on the icon consisting of three vertical dots opens a window with information about the advertiser in English and a link that redirects the user to Google Ad Transparency Center containing the advertiser’s advertisements.





### YouTube TV smartphone interface – Shorts

No political advertising was detected.

### YouTube PC interface – Video

Video advertisement is shown before the requested video itself is played on YouTube. The bottom left corner of the video advertisement contains a message, e.g.: “Sponsored 1 of 2 1:15 (i) harabin2024.sk/podpora/”. Clicking on the “Ad” icon opens a window with information about the advertiser in English with a link that redirects the user to Google Ad Transparency Center containing the advertiser’s advertisements.



#### **About this advertiser**

Advertiser identity verified by Google

Paid for by

Štefan Harabin

The advertiser is responsible for the accuracy of this information, which Google has not confirmed. **See this advertiser's election ads**

#### **Why you're seeing this ad**

##### **Ad Settings**

Update your ad preferences in Google in **Ad Settings**.

This is an ad. Ads are paid and are always labeled with "Ad" or "Sponsored". They're ranked based on a number of factors, including advertiser bid and ad quality. Some ads may contain reviews. Reviews aren't verified by Google, but Google checks for and removes fake content when it's identified. **Learn more**




### YouTube PC interface – Shorts

No political advertising was detected in the course of the monitoring exercise.

### YouTube TV interface – Video

Video advertisement is shown before the requested video itself or while the requested video plays on YouTube. The top left corner contains the name of the entity sponsoring the content and a statement such as: “Sponsored”. Clicking on “Sponsored” opens the “About Ads” window containing a link or a QR code the user can use to learn more about the advertisement from Google Ads Transparency Center.



About Ad  
To learn more about this ad and manage your ad preferences, click on (*link*) or scan this QR code with your mobile device (*QR code*)

### YouTube TV interface – Shorts

No political advertising was detected in the course of the monitoring exercise.

### 3.5 Disinformation narratives about the candidates for the office of the President of the Slovak Republic and narratives challenging the official results of the Election of the President of the Slovak Republic

In frame of its monitoring of the election campaign on social media platforms, the Council for Media Services (CMS) did not receive any complaints requesting a review of content.

However, the CMS identified and actively communicated with platforms in the event of the occurrence of content potentially violating the terms of these services, both through its own monitoring capabilities and on the basis of notifications from other government institutions. In accordance with the provisions of Article 110(3)(q) of the AMS<sup>13</sup> and based on the above-mentioned facts, the Office of the CMS notified the relevant platforms of the circumstances of presence of this content on their services, requesting that they review the content in terms of potential violations of the Terms of Service ("ToS").

#### 3.5.1 Meta

Meta's Terms of Service for Facebook and Instagram regarding the publishing of misinformation, "Voter or Census Interference" section, explicitly state, among other things: *"In an effort to promote election and census integrity, we remove misinformation that is likely to directly contribute to a risk of interference with people's ability to participate in those processes. This includes misinformation about who can vote, qualifications for voting, whether a vote will be counted, and what information or materials must be provided in order to vote."*<sup>14</sup> On this basis, the CMS reported to Meta the content described below.

##### [Narrative about the manipulation of the results of the first round of the presidential election](#)


From 27 March 2024 to 6 April 2024 – the date of the second round of elections, Facebook users disseminated content about the allegedly manipulated vote counting in the first round of the presidential election. This manipulation supposedly led to the victory of the candidate Ivan Korčok. Multiple variants of this content were published by users – a text, a chart/image, or a combination of both. In some cases, the content was modified. In addition to the alleged evidence of manipulation of the vote counting, it also included claims that this action was supported ESET and that similar methods had been used during the presidential elections in the USA and the Czech Republic. The common feature of all this content was the information about the alleged evidence supposedly proving that vote counting was manipulated.

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<sup>13</sup> Article 110(3)(q) AMS: "Furthermore, the regulator is empowered to cooperate with online content-sharing platforms in the efficient, proportionate and non-discriminatory application of the rules for the provision of their services."

<sup>14</sup> [Meta's Terms of Service related to misinformation](#).





This is being shared on TG

Manipulation of votes.

Someone has pulled off a stunt in our "democratic election". They took a picture they shouldn't have...

With 96.83% votes counted, these were the results:

I. Korčok 552 651 votes

P. Pelegríny 576 999 votes

Š. Harabin 180 290 votes

With 99.71 % votes counted, these were the results:

I. Korčok 931 688 votes

P. Pelegríny 824 476 votes

Š. Harabin 260 885 votes

There is less than 4% difference (3.88) between 96.83% and 99.71%, how could there be such a sharp increase of votes from 1,449,144 after 96.83% had been counted to 2,207,356 after 99.71% had been counted.

There are nine candidates running in the first round of the 2024 Slovak presidential election, competing for votes of their constituents. Originally, there were two more, but Andrej Danko and Róbert Švec withdrew and expressed their support for Štefan Harabin.

Once reported, the content was assigned by Meta to independent fact-checkers working with the platforms to verify the truthfulness of the published information. On 28 March 2024 Demagog.sk, one of the official fact-checkers for Meta, published a debunking statement (refutation of false claims and information supported by relevant sources)<sup>15</sup>. Independent fact-checkers refuted reports of manipulation of the vote counting in the first round of the presidential election. As a result, on 29 March 2024 the CMS noted that Meta applied labelling (i.e. information for users of the platform that the content in question contains false information). It should be noted that although this content is labelled as false, the platform still allows users to view, interact with ("like"), comment on and even share and disseminate such content.

<sup>15</sup> Link to the article "[Presidential election was not rigged, there was no leap in votes before the end](#)", tackling this false information, is published on the Demagog.sk website.

6 d. · 🌐

Manipulácia s hlasmi.  
Niekomu sa podaril husársky kúsok pri našich "demokratických voľbách". Odfotil, čo nemal...  
Pri sčítaní 96,83% hlasov mal

---

I. Korčok 552 651 hlasov  
P. Pelegríny 576 999 hlasov  
Š. Harabin 180 290 hlasov  
Po sčítaní 99,71 % hlasov mal

---

I. Korčok 931 688 hlasov  
P. Pelegríny 824 476 hlasov  
Š. Harabin 260 885 hlasov  
Medzi 96,83% a 99,71 % nie je rozdiel ani 4% (3,88), ako mohol byť tak brutálny nárast hlasov z 1,449 144 po celkovom sčítaní 96,83% na 2,207 356 pri sčítaní 99,71%.

To môže byť asi len pre negramotných, ktorí nevedia ani základné počty, uvažujme ved pri čísle 1,4 miliona by to muselo byť nejakých 50% sčítaných hlasov a nie 96% ????

No ESET urobil čo mohol, už sa nemohol dopustiť takej chyby ako pri parlamentných voľbách (ved šéfa esetu to stálo život).

No niet sa čo čudovať, takto dopadli voľby v USA? v Česku, ale aj posledné voľby kedy sme získali ženu za prezidentku na Slovensku

a zaujímavé, že v 1. kole má víťazný kandidát vždy 42, ...% no a v druhom to bude tých 57% a niečo 😊

No takto funguje systém Dominion a ani Trump sa nedovolal pravdy v USA.

My sa dovoláme?... sami bez pomoci asi nie.

0:17

0% Ivan Korčok, Peter Pellegrini, Štefan Harabin, Krisztián Forró, Igor Matovič, Ján Kubiš, Patrik Dubovský, Marián Kotleba, Milan Náhlík

Graf SITA, Dáta: Statistický úrad SR

**sčítaných 96,83%**

A Flourish chart

Kandidát	Percentá	Počet hlasov
Patrik Dubovský	0,69 %	10 139
Krisztián Forró	3,89 %	56 617
Štefan Harabin	12,41 %	180 290
Ivan Korčok	38,06 %	552 651
Marian Kotleba	0,61 %	8 991
Ján Kubiš	1,91 %	27 830
Igor Matovič	2,31 %	33 601
Milan Náhlík	0,13 %	2 026
Peter Pellegrini	39,74 %	576 999

**hlasov 1 449 144**

V prvom kole prezidentských volieb na Slovensku v roku 2024 o priazeň voličov súperia deväti kandidáti. Pôvodne ich bolo o dvoch viac, ale Andrej Danko a Róbert Švec sa vzdali a podporili Štefana Harabina.

SITA NAJ ČASOVÁ OS VOLBY

Nepravdivé informácie Rovnaké informácie boli v inom príspevku skontrolované nezávislými preverovateľmi faktov.  
[Zobraziť dôvod](#)

🤔 4 1 komentár Zdieľania: 13

Manipulation of votes.  
Someone has pulled off a stunt in our "democratic election". They took a picture they shouldn't have...  
With 96.83% votes counted, these were the results:  
I. Korčok 552 651 votes  
P. Pelegríny 576 999 votes  
Š. Harabin 180 290 votes  
With 99.71 % votes counted, these were the results:  
I. Korčok 931 688 votes  
P. Pelegríny 824 476 votes  
Š. Harabin 260 885 votes  
There is less than 4% difference (3.88) between 96.83% and 99.71%, how could there be such a sharp increase of votes from 1,449,144 after 96.83% had been counted to 2,207,356 after 99.71% had been counted.

Only the illiterate who are not familiar with basic arithmetic can believe it, let's think: with 1.4 million it would have to be around 50% of the votes counted, not 96%????  
But ESET did what they could, they couldn't afford to make the same mistake as in the parliamentary election (ESET's boss paid with his life).  
No surprise there. Is this how the US elections played out? The same in the Czech Republic, but also the last election which gave us a woman president in Slovakia, it's interesting that in the first round the winning candidate always has 42% and in the second round it will be the 57% plus...  
But that's how the Dominion system works and even Trump didn't get justice in the US.  
Will we get our justice? ...alone, without help, probably not.

There are nine candidates running in the first round of the 2024 Slovak presidential election, competing for votes of their constituents. Originally, there were two more, but Andrej Danko and Róbert Švec withdrew and expressed their support for Štefan Harabin.

**False information. The same information was verified by independent fact-checkers in another post. See the reason**

25. marec o 15:21 ·

Manipulácia s hlasmi.  
Niekomu sa podaril husársky kúsok pri našich "demokratických voľbách". Odfotil, čo nemal...  
Pri sčítaní 96,83% hlasov mal

---

I. Korčok 552 651 hlasov  
P. Pellegrini 576 999 hlasov  
Š. Harabin 180 290 hlasov

Po sčítaní 99,71 % hlasov mal

---

I. Korčok 931 688 hlasov  
P. Pellegrini 824 476 hlasov  
Š. Harabin 260 885 hlasov

Medzi 96,83% a 99,71 % nie je rozdiel ani 4% ( 3,88), ako mohol byť tak brutálny nárast hlasov z 1, 449 144 po celkovom sčítaní 96,83% na 2, 207 356 pri sčítaní 99,71%.

To môže byť asi len pre negramotných, ktorí nevedia ani základné počty, uvažujeme ved pri čísle 1,4 miliona by to muselo byť nejakých 50% sčítaných hlasov a nie 96% ????

No ESET urobil čo mohol, už sa nemohol dopustiť takej chyby ako pri parlamentných voľbách ( ved šéfa esetu to stálo život).

No niet sa čo čudovať, takto dopadli voľby v USA? v Česku, ale aj posledné voľby kedy sme získali ženu za prezidentku na Slovensku a zaujímavé, že v 1. kole má víťazný kandidát vždy 42, ...% no a v druhom to bude tých 57% a niečo 😊

No takto funguje systém Dominion a ani Trump sa nedovolal pravdy v USA .

My sa dovoľáme?... sami bez pomoci asi nie.

Graf: SITA, Dáta: Štatistický úrad SR

scítaných 96,83%

A Flourish chart

Kandidát	Percentá	Počet hlasov
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Igor Matovič	2,31 %	33 601
Milan Náhlík	0,13 %	2 026
Peter Pellegrini	39,74 %	576 999

hlasov 1 449 144

V prvom kole prezidentských volieb na Slovensku v roku 2024 o priazeň voličov súperia deväti kandidáti. Pôvodne ich bolo o dvoch

15 Komentáre: 8 Zdieľania: 217

96.83% votes counted

1.449.114 votes


The CMS further noted that Meta did not respond to the above-mentioned disinformation in form of a text, even though this type of disinformation was identified by fact-checkers as disinformation, just like the content in form of an image. As shown by the screenshots below, unlike the posted images, no labelling or any other functional method was applied to the textual sections to inform users of the service that the information is not fact-based.



Manipulation of votes.  
Someone has pulled off a stunt in our "democratic election". They took a picture they shouldn't have...  
With 96.83% votes counted, these were the results:  
I. Korčok 552 651 votes  
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Only the illiterate who are not familiar with basic arithmetic can believe it, let's think: with 1.4 million it would have to be around 50% of the votes counted, not 96%????  
But ESET did what they could, they couldn't afford to make the same mistake as in the parliamentary election (ESET's boss paid with his life).  
No surprise there. Is this how the US elections played out? The same in the Czech Republic, but also the last election which gave us a woman president in Slovakia, it's interesting that in the first round the winning candidate always has 42% and in the second round it will be the 57% plus...  
But that's how the Dominion system works and even Trump didn't get justice in the US.  
Will we get our justice? ...alone, without help, probably not.

I AM IN FAVOUR OF EXCLUSIVELY MANUAL COUNTING OF VOTES!

Furthermore, the CMS noted that the service did not label the relevant image content, which was published and made publicly available in comments under other posts. However, identical images were labelled if they were published as separate content.



In this context, the CMS concludes that the monitoring of the services operated by Meta:


- detected an increased occurrence of published and disseminated narratives that challenged the integrity of the elections and the officially certified results of the presidential election, compared to the other monitored platforms (see cases related to Google and ByteDance described below),
- simultaneously, these narratives were duly refuted in a relatively short time by independent fact-checkers who specialise in verifying information,
- in this context, the CMS concludes that regarding the application of labelling as a tool that informs users of the service of the presence of misleading content, there is an inconsistency in Meta's response to content that communicates identical narrative challenging the integrity of the electoral process. Identical posts are sometimes labelled and other times not.
- The CMS further observed inconsistency on the part of Meta in responding to content published as separate content, as opposed to identical content published as comments in the comment section.



In relation to the above-mentioned findings, the CMS concluded that Meta's approach to narratives challenging the integrity of the electoral process was inconsistent, as was its approach to the application of its own rules in case of the deepfake videos during the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. These aspects were described in detail in the CMS's monitoring report *"Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic"* in Chapter 3.4. *"Deepfake videos created using AI technology"*, p. 30 ff<sup>16</sup>. In conclusion, the risks arising from the misuse of Meta's platforms can in practice be regarded as systemic risks under Article 34(1)(a) of the DSA<sup>17</sup>. According to Article 34 of the DSA, platforms must assess, at least once a year, any systemic risks stemming from the design or functioning of their service. All risk assessments must reflect potential negative impacts on the four categories of systemic risks, including any actual or foreseeable negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes. On 26 April 2024, in the context of mitigating systemic risks, the European Commission issued a set of guidelines<sup>18</sup> to help VLOPSEs ensure compliance with their obligations under Article 35 of the DSA in relation to risks to electoral processes. In light of the above-mentioned findings, in particular the inconsistency of Meta's response, it can be concluded that Meta's platforms do not adequately enforce their terms of service (pursuant to Article 35(1)(b)), and thus do not effectively mitigate the risks identified in accordance with Article 34 of the DSA. This finding of the Slovak media regulator serves as an important input for further discussions with regulators, in particular with the European Commission, on the evaluation of systemic risks in the context of electoral processes.

#### [Narrative about the manipulation of the results of the first round combined with potential hate speech](#)

On 27 March 2024 content was detected on Facebook, operated by Meta, claiming manipulation of the electoral process by ESET, a company allegedly linked to the US secret service CIA. This content included a picture of the publication *"Židokracia"* ("Jewocracy") whose author, Marián Magát, is being prosecuted for extremist criminal activity, and the cover graphics of the publication itself can also be seen as controversial due to the use of generalising anti-Semitic elements.



The election will be won by USA-Korčok... effectively supported by ESET = CIA branch which provided the main election computer for falsification "JEWOCRACY"

<sup>16</sup> [Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic.](#)

<sup>17</sup> [Regulation 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC \(Digital Services Act\).](#)

<sup>18</sup> [Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes pursuant to Article 35\(3\) of Regulation \(EU\) 2022/2065.](#)

While the notification for the platform was being prepared, it was noted that the content in question had already been removed from the service and therefore it was no longer necessary to notify Meta.

[Sponsored post about the alleged lawsuit against candidate Ivan Korčok](#)

On 4 April 2024 sponsored content in form of tabloid headlines (“Explosive news for the TV industry! Get ready for an incredible twist that will change everything!” and “IVAN KORČOK, you shouldn’t have said that in public”) was detected, reporting on the alleged shocking revelations about Ivan Korčok. Clicking on this content opened a separate website, graphics of which copied the website of the popular media outlet [aktuality.sk](#), which reportedly published this article on 7 February 2024. According to this article, the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) supposedly sued Ivan Korčok for his alleged statements in a live television broadcast. The URL address of the content in question does not correspond with the current URL address of [aktuality.sk](#), meaning it was not an authentic website of the media outlet. An ex-post check of the [aktuality.sk](#) portal confirmed that such an article had never been published on the news website and that the NBS had never filed a lawsuit against Ivan Korčok. The monitoring further revealed that the advertiser of the sponsored post is a Facebook page called TravelFure, which poses as a travel magazine. It was further established that TravelFure is indeed a travel and holiday magazine, but that the website in question is not the official website of the magazine. It was a relatively recent website using graphic design and logo resembling those of TravelFure magazine. This site also publishes exclusively sponsored links targeted against Ivan Korčok.

**TravelFure**  
Sponzorované · 🌐

Výbušné správy pre televízny priemysel!... Zobrazit' viac

**STARTITUP**

**Ivan Korčok**  
Nemal si to hovoriť na verejnosti

travelfure.com  
Nepremeškajte šancu dozvedieť sa to ako prví! [Viac informácií](#)

👍 😄 10 4 komentáre · 3 zdieľania

👍 Páči sa mi to 🗨 Komentovať ➦ Zdieľať

Explosive news for the TV industry!  
See more  
Ivan Korčok  
You shouldn't have said that in public  
Don't miss your chance to read this  
among the first!



ŽivotvČesku.cz · [Sledovať](#)





Identifikátor kódu: 66516279938047

Active

Dátum spustenia: 3.4.2024

Platformy

Transparentnosť v Európskej únii

O inzertentovi

Prijemca a platca

Informácie o reklamách a používaní údajov

TravelPure

Identifikátor kódu: 66516279938047

Výbušné správy pre televízny priemysel! Pripravte sa na neuveriteľný zriek, ktorý vďaka zmeně

**Ivan Korčok**

Nemal si to hovoriť na verejnosti

TRAVELPURE.COM

Nepremeškajte šancu dozvedieť sa to ako prví!

Viac inform...

Library ID: (number)  
Active  
Launch date  
Platforms

European Union transparency  
About the advertiser  
Beneficiary and payer  
Information about ads and using data

wjs5ngodabge4jib0jdoi8lik.movieboardss.com/dnp/sk-ivan-aktuality-dynamic/?ABtestName=eth&cep=BEhrpznmPX9hh9D85l6JSJlB8xNHYNRxu\_u\_ohv-d4s-v0YswPp...

aktuality.sk

SLOVENSKO REGIÓNÝ SVET TÉMY EKONOMIKA PRÉMIÓVÉ ČÍTANIE KOMENTÁRE CESTOVANIE VIAC Predplátné Pihlúit

Najnovšie správy Vojna na Ukrajine Veľa výskum - naša šanca OBCHOD PODCAST VIDEO TV program Horoskopy Slovník

Ekonómia | včera 07.02.2024 12:05 | 3 min. čítania

**Národná banka Slovenska žaluje Ivana Korčoka za to, čo povedal v živom televíznom vysielaní**

STARTITUP DISKUSNÝ KLUB

„Je to najlepšia príležitosť, akú som kedy videl, ako môžu normálni a fažko pracujúci ľudia zarobiť niečo navyše“

**Zdá sa, že máte vypnuté**

Primátorovi Košíc vyslovili poslanci nedôveru a prehlasovali jeho veto

NAJČITANEJŠIE

Spravodajstvo Iné témy

4 hod 12 hod 1 deň

3 dni

1. ONLINE: V parlamente pokračuje konflikt pre návrh skrátiť premieňanie znásilnenia. Je to horšie, ako som si
2. Tomáš Hellebrandt prehovoril o odchode z parlamentu. Premiéra sa pýta, odkiaľ mal informácie z
3. **Nový** Robertovi Ficovi a koalícii sa to podarilo. Ukázali, akí sú amatéri (komentár Martina Behuľa)
4. Európska komisia pozastavila Slovensku čerpanie takmer miliardy eur z plánu obnovy
5. Expremiérka Radíčová: Pod tlakom verejnosti môže stratiť väčšinu aj tento Ficizmus (podcast)
6. Valerij Zalužnyj končí vo funkcii hlavného veliteľa. Ukrajinci určite zvíťazia, povzbudil národ
7. Vladimir Putin poskytol rozhovor

Národná banka Slovenska žaluje Ivana Korčoka za to, čo povedal v živom televíznom vysielaní

Economics \* yesterday 07.02.2024 12:05 \* 3 min. reading  
**The National Bank of Slovakia is suing Ivan Korčok for his statements in a live television broadcast**

After reporting the content to Meta, the CMS received a response on 4 April 2024 stating that the sponsored content on the website violated Facebook's Terms of Service and was therefore removed.

During its monitoring exercise, the CMS identified a total of **88 cases of potential violation of Meta's Terms of Service** (all potentially problematic content was published on Facebook) thematically related to the 2024 presidential election. The majority (**51 cases, i.e. 58%**) of the **reported content was assigned** by Meta **to independent fact-checkers for verification**. Out of these, only a **fraction (9 out of 51 cases)** was labelled as false information. **By the time of finalising this report, it had not responded** to a large proportion (**34%**) of all reported content **and had removed only 8%**. Regarding the content which was removed, it included primarily the TravelFure website along with the advertisements (5 out of 7 cases of removed content).

Meta (Facebook), in total <b>88 (100%)</b> reported cases <b>27/3/2024 - 6/4/2024</b>		
<b>Removed</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8%</b>
<b>Send to 3PFC</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>58%</b>
<b>No reply</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>34%</b>

#### Advertiser with insufficient identity verification

On 3 April 2024, the CMS was made aware of political advertisements involving suspicions of inadequate identity verification, which constitutes a part of the election monitoring processes for approving political advertisements on Facebook. The profile entitled "*Národná petícia*" ("National Petition") used the platform to disseminate paid advertisements targeted against both candidates for the Slovak presidency who got to the second round of the presidential election. Criticising the candidates, the profile claimed that they supported the war in Ukraine, and spread claims about the alleged invalidity of the candidacy of one of the candidates and the unconstitutionality of the first round of the presidential election. Some of the advertisements even called for a suspension of the second round of the presidential election and a re-counting of votes.

From 26 March 2024 (three days after the first round) to 4 April 2024, this profile published 26 different types of paid political advertisements. The website itself was created on 24 March 2024, i.e. right after the first round of elections.

**Národná petícia**  
Sponzorované · Platí to narodnapeticia.sk ·

Viete, čo spája Pellegriniho a Korčoka? 🤔 Obaja sú ako siamské dvojčatá 🧑🏻🧑🏻, podporujú vojnu a priame dodávky zbraní Ukrajinu 🇺🇦, LGBTI 🏳️🌈 a sú proti neutralite Slovenska 🇸🇰. Na neprávne nesmie byť založené právo 🏛️. Prvé kolo prezidentských volieb sa podľa názoru JUDr. Štefana Harabina konalo v rozpore s ústavou 📜. Občania, do kedy budeme tolerovať nezákonnosť na najvyšších poschodiach moci? 🗳️ Pridajte sa k petícii 📝 za vyhlásenie nulnosti kandidatúry a teda za nové voľby 🗳️.



**PODPORTE NÁZOR  
JUDR. ŠTEFANA HARABINA  
O NEÚSTAVNOSTI PELLEGRINIHO  
KANDIDATÚRY.**

NARODNAPETICIA.SK  
Podpište národnú petíciu!

Viac informácií

**Národná petícia**  
**Sponsored \* Paid for by**  
**narodnapeticia.sk**

Do you know what Pellegrini and Korčok have in common? They are like Siamese twins, they support war and direct supply of arms to Ukraine, LGBTI and are against the neutrality of Slovakia. The rule of law cannot be based on injustice. In the opinion of JUDr. Štefan Harabin, the first round of the presidential election violated the Constitution. Fellow citizens, how much longer will we tolerate illegality at the highest levels of power? Join the petition to invalidate their candidacy and for a new election!

SUPPORT THE OPINION OF JUDR.

STEFAN HARABIN ON THE  
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF  
PELLEGRINI'S CANDIDACY.

NARODNAPETICIA.SK

**Sign the national petition!** Learn more

**Podrobnosti reklamy**

Identifikátor knižnice: 1094534575114730

Neaktívne

2. 4. 2024 – 4. 4. 2024

Platformy 📱 📺

Kategórie 📁

Odhadovaná veľkosť publika: 100 tis. – 500 tis. ⓘ


Minutá suma (EUR): <100 € ⓘ

Impresie: 6 tis. – 7 tis. ⓘ

Táto reklama má viac verzí ⓘ

**Národná petícia**  
Sponzorované · Platí to narodnapeticia.sk  
Identifikátor knižnice: 1094534575114730

Obidvaja kandidáti sú zradcovia, neni koho voliť. Pellegrini aj Korčok menia názory ako počasie. Na Fica, na covid, na Ukrajinu. Korčok aj Pellegrini doteraz slúžili komu bolo treba. Žiadni skutoční vlastenci. Na Slovákov a Slovensko kašľú. Zradiš raz, zradiš znova.



**O vyhlásení**

Keď inzerent kategorizuje svoju reklamu ako súvisiacu so spoločenskými zálež. zaplatil. [Viac informácií](#)

**Informácie od inzerenta**  
Tieto informácie zadal inzerent.  
Odoslané 24. 3. 2024

**Vyhlasenie**  
narodnapeticia.sk

**Telefónne číslo**  
+421233323409

**E-mail**  
info@narodnapeticia.sk

**Web**  
<https://www.narodnapeticia.sk/>

**Adresa**  
Hlavná 13197/4A, Bratislava, Slovakia 831 01, SK

V Centre pomoci sa dozviete viac o tom, aké podmienky musia splniť inzerent politiky. [Viac informácií](#)

Library ID: (number)  
Inactive  
(period)  
Platforms  
Categories  
Estimated audience size: 100k – 500k  
Amount spent (EUR): <100  
Impressions> 6k – 7k  
This ad has multiple versions

**About the disclaimer**

When an advertiser categorises their ad as being about social issues, elections or politics, they are required to disclose who paid for the ad. **Learn more.**

Information from the advertiser

This information was submitted by the advertiser.

Submitted on 24 March 2024

Visit the Help Centre to learn about what we require from advertisers to run ads about social issues, elections or politics. **Learn more**

The advertiser details the user has to provide to be able to publish political advertisement include a phone number, an email address, a website, an address, and a disclaimer. However, the name of the advertiser is missing, and all that is provided is the address of the website "narodnapeticia.sk". The name of the owner is missing as well.

In this context, the CMS notes that there had been a similar case on Facebook, operated by Meta, during the election campaign for the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic, where it was not possible to determine whether the sponsor was a legal entity or a natural person<sup>19</sup>. This is mandatory under Meta's Terms of Service, the DSA and the Proposal for a Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. The CMS therefore concludes that the goal of transparency was not fulfilled.

However, as this content did not formally meet the definition criteria of the illegal content and did not formally conflict with the rules of publishing content on the service, the CMS did not formally contact the platform regarding the circumstances of this content.

[Publication of political advertising during the electoral silence period](#)

On 4 April 2024, the CMS, in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, was made aware of the presence of paid political advertisements on Facebook. These advertisements were labelled by their sponsors as "Social Issues, Elections or Politics", and were posted on the profiles of politicians Roman Michelka and Gyimesi György. The content of this paid advertising focused on criticism of candidate Ivan Korčok.

The advertisements were active from 2 April to 6 April 2024, from 3 April to 5 April 2024 and from 3 April to 7 April 2024. These advertisements were detected while the electoral silence period before the second round of the presidential election was in force (the electoral silence period was in force from 4 April 2024 from 00:00 to 6 April 2024 22:05).

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<sup>19</sup> [Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic](#), Chapter 3.3 Issues related to verification of the advertiser's identity, p. 26.

Identifikátor knižnice: 798170414979902

Neaktívne

2. 4. 2024 – 6. 4. 2024

Platformy  

Kategórie 

Odhadovaná veľkosť publika: >1 mil. 

Minutá suma (EUR): 100 € – 199 € 

Impresie: 60 tis. – 70 tis. 

 **Gyimesi György**  
Sponzorované • Platí to Gyimesi György  
Identifikátor knižnice: 798170414979902

SK KORČOKOVA BOMBA MEDZI OČI KDH

Kedysi kresťanské, dnes už len demokratické hnutie pripomína rohožku. Nedávno sme mali možnosť sledovať ako poslanci hnutia s rozžiarenými očami doslova spievali chválospevy na svojho kandidáta Korčoka a vôbec si nevšimli, že pritom vlastne tancujú tak, ako piska progresívna pišťalka. Samozrejme je na orgánoch...



Library ID: (number)

Inactive

(period)

Platforms

Categories

Estimated audience size: >1 mil.

Amount spent (EUR): 100 – 199

Impressions: 60k – 70k

#### Podrobnosti reklamy

Identifikátor knižnice: 1058354721927234

Neaktívne

3. 4. 2024 – 7. 4. 2024

Platformy 

Kategórie 

Odhadovaná veľkosť publika: 100 tis. – 500 tis. 

Minutá suma (EUR): <100 € 

Impresie: 15 tis. – 20 tis. 

 **Roman Michelko - poslanec NR SR**  
Sponzorované • Platí to Roman Michelko  
Identifikátor knižnice: 1058354721927234

#SNS #mier #slovensko #prezident



Library ID: (number)

Inactive

(period)

Platforms

Categories

Estimated audience size: 100k – 500k

Amount spent (EUR): <100

Impressions: 15k – 20k

Meta does not actively monitor compliance with the electoral silence period during election period on Facebook, claiming that the responsibility for compliance with these national policies lies directly with the advertiser sponsoring political advertisements. The CMS therefore recommended the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic to report this content to the State Commission for Elections and Control of Funding of Political Parties, established as an independent body to control the financing of political parties and political movements, to manage elections and to ascertain the results of elections.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> [The State Commission for Elections and Control of Funding of Political Parties.](#)




### 3.5.2 ByteDance

The Terms of Service of ByteDance, the owner of TikTok, explicitly state in the “Integrity and Authenticity” section, “Civic and Election Integrity” subsection, among other things: “We want to enable the informed exchange of civic ideas in a way that fosters productive dialogue. We do not allow misinformation about civic and electoral processes regardless of intent. This includes misinformation about how to vote or register to vote, qualifications for candidates, ballot counting and certification procedures, and the final results of an election.”<sup>21</sup> Based on these facts, the CMS reported the following content to ByteDance.

#### [Narrative about global interference with election results and impact on the 2024 Slovak presidential election](#)

On 27 March 2024 a video in English with Czech subtitles was detected on TikTok, operated by ByteDance. According to the accompanying text, it reportedly contained authentic footage of the testimony of a programmer who allegedly testified in a US court about the development and use of software to manipulate election results. The text accompanying the video further states that the ongoing election in Slovakia was equally manipulated.



Clinton Eugene Curtis in Ohio court in 2004, talking about programmes which can change election results. In October 2000 I wrote the prototype of this program for the President's Congressman Tom Feeney in the company I worked for in Oviedo, Florida. Programmer, lawyer and former NASA employee.

The monitoring exercise also revealed that this video was shared from TikTok to other platforms, including Facebook. After the content had been reported to ByteDance by the CMS, the CMS was notified of its removal from TikTok on 3 April 2024. This content in form of videos shared on other platforms was thereby removed as well.


<sup>21</sup> [ByteDance' terms of service policy regarding integrity and authenticity.](#)

### 3.5.3 Google

The misinformation policies section of Google's Terms of Service for YouTube, "Elections misinformation policies" sub-section, specify, among other things: *"Do not post content on YouTube advancing false claims that widespread fraud or errors occurred in certain past elections to determine heads of government. Or, content that claims that the certified results of those elections were false."*<sup>22</sup> Based on this, the CMS reported the following content to Google.

#### [Narrative about the manipulation of the presidential election from abroad](#)

On 28 March 2024, a video was detected on YouTube containing claims of alleged manipulation of the official results of the first round of the presidential election in favour of candidate Ivan Korčok. Such manipulation of the election results was allegedly in the interest of the Western powers.




MANIPULATED ELECTIONS! This is how Ivan Korčok "DEFEATED" Peter Pellegrini:  
FOREIGN INTERVENTION

After the content had been reported on 30 March 2024, Google replied that its review revealed that the entire profile violated YouTube's Terms of Service and was therefore removed. The video in question was thus also deleted.

#### [Narrative about manipulation of the election at electoral commission level](#)

On 4 April 2024, a video was detected on YouTube, operated by Google, containing claims about the absence of control mechanisms for the counting of votes and the real turnout within different electoral commissions. Moreover, according to the information contained in the video, this fact was supposedly leveraged by ESET to manipulate the election results.

<sup>22</sup> [Google's terms of service – policy regarding misinformation.](#)



People still believe it was them who voted for us!

**Is ESET more than the state? Lack of control of voting minutes allows for anomalies at the end of the day...**

The vote counting system is unclear and there is no ex-post check. Why are minutes from polling stations not published on [www.volbysr.sk](http://www.volbysr.sk)? Why is the electoral silence period repeatedly extended during elections? Does this allow for manipulation? A citizen called Infovojna radio and announced that Abbot ESET will win the presidential election. What do you think, is this reality or fiction?

Why was the private company ESET entrusted as the only one to count and summarize the votes almost 15 years ago? Why do almost all politicians except Danko and Harabin pretend not to see it... **See more**

After the content had been reported, the entire channel which published the reported content was removed by Google on the very same day (4 April 2024) due to a violation of YouTube's Terms of Service.

**From 27 March 2024 to 6 April 2024 the CMS recorded a total of 91 cases of potential violation of the terms of service of the monitored platforms** (the recorded cases occurring on Facebook, TikTok and YouTube).

Provider	VLOPS	No. of cases	Removed	3PFC	No reply
Meta	Facebook	88	7 (8%)	51 (58%)	30 (34%)
Google	YouTube	2	2 (100%)	-	-
ByteDance	TikTok	1	1 (100%)	-	-

## 4 CONCLUSIONS

By virtue of its statutory powers provided for in the AMS, the CMS closely monitored Facebook, TikTok and YouTube throughout the campaign period leading up to the 2024 Election of the President of the Slovak Republic. Focusing on potential breaches of the AMS, fulfilling the commitments under the Code and compliance with the obligations under the DSA, the CMS actively engaged in a dialogue with the representatives of the monitored services. It addressed, for example, the efforts to raise awareness of users of the services, as well as the transparency of political advertising.

The CMS did not receive any complaints from the public regarding coverage of elections on social media. The monitoring exercise concerned the transparency of political advertising and the implementation of preventive activities targeting the public. The identified shortcomings included the absence of translations into Slovak, missing advertiser details and, in case of Meta, inconsistent moderation of potentially disinformation narratives interfering in the course of the election campaign.

Regarding the monitoring of the platform's compliance with provisions of the DSA, the CMS considers that the monitored platforms failed to consistently implement and comply with all the obligations concerning the transparency of political advertising under Articles 26 and 39 of the DSA. Potential violations of the DSA included the limited functionality of the platforms' ad libraries. This has a significant negative impact on users' effective access to information. Furthermore, the authors of this report identified the issue of Meta's inconsistent approach to moderation of disinformation narratives that impact the election campaign, as well as questionable adequacy and transparency of the contact details provided by political advertisers who had successfully completed Meta's verification process. This situation can be considered continuous, as fundamentally similar potential shortcomings had been identified and described by the CMS in its monitoring report "Monitoring of platform functionalities in relation to the 2023 Elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic".

The conclusions presented in this report provide an overview of the readiness of platforms for the 2024 Slovak presidential election and can serve as an inspiration for other EU Member States. The authors recommend leveraging the results of this report to assess the effectiveness of the Code and to provide feedback at European level, for example on the already implemented DSA or forthcoming European legislation – the Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising which is expected to enter into force before the 2024 European Elections.